outside of the immediate family. Now consider immediate-family incest. Here, statistics tell in favor of a universal norm. Most cultures avoid sex with immediate kin. The exceptions show that these norms can be overridden by culture, not that the norms are learned. However, the case against moral nativism about immediate-family incest can be fought on other grounds. If procreating with immediate family members can cause a Cheap puma uk genetic depression, then there is reason to think we would evolve a tendency to avoid incest. This concession may look like it supports the case for moral nativism, but I think it actually does the opposite. Incest avoidance may be phylogenetically ancient. speed cat big 2011 It may long predate the emergence of our species and the emergence of morality. If so, we may have an innate tendency to avoid incest, but not an innate moral rule against incest. If we naturally avoid something, we don’t need a moral rule against it. If we are disgusted by rotting food, we don’t need to have a moral rule to prevent us from eating it; we do not feel ashamed when we accidentally eat bread with mold on it, and we would not condemn another person for doing so. To turn incest avoidance into an incest taboo, a culture must punish those who engage in incest and condition perpetrators to feel ashamed. The transition from in puma trionfo cest avoidance to incest taboos takes cultural effort. If this story is right, then there should be a large number of societies with no explicit moral prohibition against immediate-family incest. This is exactly what the anthropological record seems to show. Thornhill (1991) found that only forty-four percent of the world’s cultures, in a large diverse sample, have immediate-family incest taboos. This casts doubt on the conjecture that there is an innate moral rule. It would be hasty to draw any extravagant antinativist conclusions from the discussion so far. I have not demonstrated that there are no innate universal moral rules. Instead, I have argued that some of the most obvious candidates for innate universal moral rules are either not innate, not universal, or not essentially moral. I think the considerations raised here suggest that it will be difficult to make a strong case for nativism by identifying universal moral rules. Moral nativists must rely on other evidence. Jesse J. Prinz Universal Domains I have been arguing that it is difficult to find examples of moral universals. The rules by which people abide vary across cultural boundaries. In response, the nativist might complain that I was looking for universals at too puma speedcat suede fine a grain. Perhaps specific moral precepts are variable, but broad moral categories are universal. By analogy, even if one did not fi nd linguistic universals at the level of words, one might expect to fi nd universals at the level of syntactic categories. If we ascend to a more abstract level of moral competence, we might fi nd that there are moral universals after all. This is an increasingly popular view among moral nativists. It is a version of what Hauser calls “temperate nativism,” and defenders include Fiske (1991), Haidt and Joseph (2004), and Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997). One way to think about this approach is that we have several innate moral domains, which determine the kinds of situations that are amenable to moralization. The moral domains may even contain rule schemas, whose variables get filled in by culture. For example, there might be an innate rule of the form (x) [Don’t harm x, unless P]. Culture determines the scope of the quantifier (family, neighbors, all people, cows, fetuses, etc.) and the exceptions (initiation rights, revenge, deterrence, sports, etc.). Rather than surveying all of the innate domain theories, I will focus Puma shoes uk on one recent example, which attempts to synthesize many of the others. Haidt and Joseph (2004) find that certain moral domai puma trainers for men ns are mentioned more frequently than others when authors try to classify moral rules across cultures (and even across species). There are four domains that enjoy significant consensus. The first is the domain of suffering; all societies seem to have rules pertaining to the well-being of other pumas shoes 2011 s. The schematic harm prohib puma trionfo uk shops ition might fall into this domain, along with rules that compel us to help the needy. The second domain concerns hierarchy; here we fi nd rules of dominance and submission, which determine the distribution of power in a society. Next comes reciprocity; this is the domain containing rules of exchange and fairness, like those discussed in the previous section. Finally, there is a domain of purity; these rules are especially prevalent in nonsecular societies, but purity rules also include some dietary taboos and sexual mores. Haidt and Joseph believe that each domain corresponds to an innate mental module, and each kind of rule is regulated by a different family of emotions. Suffering elicits sympathy and compassion; hierarchies are enforced by resentment and respect; reciprocity violations provoke anger and guilt; and purity violations instill disgust. These domains are universal, but culture can determine the specific content of rules in each. Is Morality Innate? What counts as an impermissible harm in one culture may be morally compulsory in another. Thus, the moral domains do not furnish us with a universal morality but rather with a universal menu of categories for moral construal. If we morally condemn some action, it is in virtue of construing it as a violation in one of these domains. The innate moral domains theory is a significant departure from the view that we have innate moral rules. It allows for considerable moral variation. In this regard, it is a significant departure from the Enlightenment moral sense theories, according to which human beings are naturally able to perceive objective moral truths. Nevertheless, it is a form of moral nativism, and it is my task here to assess its plausibility. As with the innate rule the cheap puma trainers ories, there are three questions to ask: (1) Are moral domains universal? (2) Can they be learned? And (3) are they essentially moral? Let’s begin with the question of univers pumas shoes 2011 ality. As Haidt and Joseph admit, the four moral domains are emphasized to a greater or lesser degree in different cultures. Our culture is especially preoccupied with suffering and reciprocity, whereas hierarchy and purity are more important in some parts of India. This affects how we construe moral transgression. Here is a simplified example. If someone is raped in the West, people sympathize with the victim and feel rage at the rapist. In India, there will be rage at the rapist, but there is also a tendency to think the victim has become adulterated, and that shame has been brought on her household, potentially lowering their social status. This does not refute the hypothesis that the four domains are uni puma trainers for men versal, but it does suggest that they do not play the same roles across cultures. And this raises the possibility that some of the domains are not construed as morally significant in every culture. In our culture, we tend to resist moralizing impurities. In other research, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) show that American college students are disgusted when they hear about a man who masturbates into a chicken carcass, but they do not consider him immoral. In low-socioeconomic-status populations in Brazil, the same individual is morally condemned. Perhaps the purity domain has a moral status in those populations and not ours. On the sentimentalist theory that I am endorsing, this might be explained by saying that low-SES Brazilians have a moral sentiment toward masturbating with a chicken carcass: they fi puma trionfo shoes nd it both disgusting and shameful, and they would