be inclined to blame or punish offenders. Bourgeois Americans pumas shoes 2011 simply fi nd such behavior yucky. To take another case, consider the Gahuku Gama headhunters in Papua New Guinea. According to Read (1955), they do not consider it immoral to cause harm, unless that harm comes to a member of their social group. On one interpretation, they do not moralize suffering, Jesse J. Prinz as Cheap puma uk such, but only hierarchy and reciprocity puma trainers for men ; the Gahuku Gama think they have responsibilities to the people who depend on them and on whom they depend. The upshot is that if the four domains are universal, it does not follow that they are universally moral. Now consider the question of learning. Are the four domains necessarily innate, or is there an alternative explanation of how they emerge? One alternative is suggested by the fact that the domains are associated with different emotions. Let’s grant that the emotions mentioned by Haidt and Joseph are innate. We are innately endowed with sympathy, respect, anger, disgust, and so on. These innate emotions may be sufficient to explain how moral domains emerge over development. To illustrate, cheap puma trainers consider purity. Suppose people are naturally disgusted by a variety of things, such as pollution, rotting meat, bodily fl uids, disfigurement, and certain animals. This hodgepodge is unified by the fact that they all cause disgust. The disgust response has natural elicitors, but it can be extended to other things if those things can be construed as similar to the natural elicitors. For example, we can, through construal, view spitting, oral sex, eating insects, defecation, and body modification as disgusting. Now suppose, for whatever reason, that a particular society chooses to condemn some of these behaviors. That society w pumas shoes 2011 ill draw attention to the similarity between these behaviors and natural disgust elicitors, and it will inculcate feeling of both self- and other-directed blame for those who engage in them under certain circumstances. Once a society uses disgust to moralize certain behaviors, its members can be said to have a purity domain in their moral psychology. However, if this story is right, then the domain is a learned extension of a nonmoral emotion. These remarks on universality and learning have both ended up in the same place. The four domains that Haidt and Joseph postulate may not be essentially moral. They may be outgrowths of universal emotions that evolved for something other than puma trionfo shoes moral judgment. Each of the emotions they mention has nonmoral applications. We feel sympathy for the sick, but we do not make moral judgments about them; we feel respect for great musicians, but we do not feel morally obligated to submit to their authority; we feel angry at those who frustrate our goals, but we do not necessarily think they are morally blameworthy for doing so; and we feel disgusted by rotting food, but we would not denounce the person who fi nds pleasure in it. The four moral domains may be by-products of basic emotions. Negative emotions play a moral role only when they are transformed into full-blown moral sentiments. In particular, negative emotions become moral in significance only when we become disposed to feel corresponding Is Morality Innate? puma trainers for men emotions of blame toward self and others. Anger and disgust toward others take on a moral cast only when we would feel blameworthy ourselves for behaving in a similar way. Puma shoes uk In sum, I think Haidt and Joseph’s four domains may be u speed cat big 2011 niversal, but I am not convinced that they are unlearned or essentially moral. Research has not shown that all people have full-fl edged moral sentiments toward behaviors in each of the four domains. In response, the moral nativist might opt for a different strategy. Rather than looking for a family of different universal domains, nativists might look for a more fundamental divide; they might postulate a single domain of moral rules and distinguish these from nonmoral rules. On universal rule theories, some specific moral rules are universal; on universal domain theories, some general categories of moral rules are universal; on the strategy I want to consider now, the only thing that is universal is the divide between moral and nonmoral rules—it is universal that we have a morality, though the content of morality can vary in open-ended ways. Here, I am tempted to respond by pointing out that, at this level of abstraction, the postulation of moral universals does little explanatory work. Compare Geertz: “That everywhere people mate and produce children, have some sense of mine and thine, and protect themselves in one fashion or another from rain and sun are neither false nor, from some points of view, unimportant; but they are hardly very much help in drawing a portrait of man” (1973, p. 40). If the only moral universal is the existence of morality itself, then an adequate account of human moral psychology will have to focus on culturally learned rules to gain puma speedcat suede any purchase on how we actually conduct our lives. I do not want to let things rest with this dismissal. The claim that we have a universal disposition to create mora puma trionfo l rules is not entirely empty. The nativist might even compare this disposition to birdsongs. Starlings may not have any specific song in common, but their tendency to sing and to acquire songs by imitation is the consequence of an innate, domain- specific faculty. Surely the fact that all cultures have moral rules is an indication of an innate moral faculty, albeit a very flexible one. Mustn’t the antinativist concede this much? I think not. To make this case, I want to consider a popular version of the proposal that morality is a human universal. Turiel (2002), Song, Smetana, and Kim (1987), Smetana (1995), and Nucci (2001) argue that, in all cultures, people distinguish between moral rules and rules that are merely conventional. For example, it’s morally wrong to kick random strangers, but it is only conventionally wrong to wear pajamas to the office. Proponents of this view think that content of moral rules might be innately fi xed; in Jesse J. Prinz particular, they think they might all be rules involving harms. In this sense, they might be regarded as defending a version of the innate domain theory according to which there is a single innate domain based on sympathy. I will not be conc puma trionfo uk shops erned with that feature of the approach here. My main interest is the question of whether all cultures distinguish moral and conventional rules, whatever the content of those rules may be. Defenders of the universal moral/conventional distinction test their hypothesis by operationalizing the difference between moral and conventional rules. Moral rules are said to have three defining