dimensions and culturally relative dimensions. Instead, puma trionfo uk shops I think the difference is psychological. There are dimensions of rules that we regard as moral, and dimensions of rules that we regard as merely conventional. In keeping pumas shoes 2011 with the account of moral judgment that I offered earlier, I would say that the moral dimensions of rules are the dimensions that are psychologically grounded in moral sentiments. On my criteria, any dimension of a rule enforced by emotions of self-blame and other blame and directed at third parties qualifies as a moral rule. When we say that a specifi c requirement is merely “conventional,” we express our belief that we would not blame (or at least we would try not to blame) someone who failed to conform to that rule in puma trainers for men another culture. We do not blame Westerners for wearing shoes at home when they are in the West. When we say that it is “morally wrong” to disrespect others, we express our belief that we would blame someone for disrespecting others. Of course, the disposition to blame people for behaving in some way may itself be a culturally inculcated value. I have been arguing that the moral/conventional distinction is more complicated than it initially appears, but I have not rejected that distinction completely. I have admitted that certain aspects of our rules are based on emotional patterns of blame, and others are not grou cheap puma trainers nded in emotion. This gives the nativist a foothold. I have admitted that there is a way to distinguish the moral and the conventional, and the nativist is now in a position to propose that the distinction that I have just been presenting is universal. Nativists can say that all cultures have rules that are grounded in moral sentiments. I certainly don’t k pumas shoes 2011 now of any exceptions to this claim, but I am unwilling to infer that this is evidence for n Cheap puma uk ativism. In responding to Haidt and Joseph, I suggested that moral rules may emerge as by-products of nonmoral emotions. If all cultures have rules grounded in moral sentiments, it does not follow that we have an innate moral domain. In all cultures, people have realized that behavior can be shaped by conditioning emotional responses. Parents penalize their children the world over to get them to behave in desirable ways. Some penal Is Morality Innate? ties have negative emotional consequences, as they thereby serve to foster associations between behavior and negative emotions. This may be an important first step in the emergence of moral rules. Other steps will be requi puma trionfo shoes red as well, and I will consider them in the concluding section of this paper. The present point is that the universality of emotionally grounded rules should not be altogether surprising given the fact that we shape behavior through penalizing the young. Neither the tendency to penalize nor the resultant emotionally grounded rules qualify as evidence for an innat puma trainers for men e moral code. However, education through penalization could help to explain why emotionally grounded rules (the building blocks of morality) are found in all cultures. Modularity Thus far I have expressed skepticism about moral universals. If there are substantive universal moral rules or moral domains, they have yet to be identified. Moral nativists will have to look for other forms of evidence. One option is to look for moral modules in the brain. Innate faculties are often presumed to be both functionally and anatomically modular. To be functionally modular is, roughly, to process information specific to a particular dom speed cat big 2011 ain. Modules are also sometimes said to be informationally encapsulated: they do not have access to information in other modules (Fodor, 1983; see Prinz, 2006b, for a critique of Fodorian modules). To be anatomically modular is to be located within proprietary circuits of the brain. The language faculty is often presumed to be modular in both of these senses. We process language using language-specific rules and representations, and those rules and representations are implemented in specifi c regions of the brain which are vulnerable to selective defi cits. Functional modularity provides some support for nativist claims, because capacities acquired using general cognitive resources often make use of rules and representations that are available to other domains. Anatomical modularity provides support for nativity claims because some of the best candidates for innate modules (e.g., the sensory systems and, perhaps, language) are anatomically localizable. If moral capacities could be shown to be functionally and anatomically modular, that would help the case for moral nativism. To explore this strategy, I will begin with Puma shoes uk some work by Cosmides and Tooby (1992). Cosmides and Tooby do not try to prove that there is a single coherent morality module. Rather, they argue that one specifi c aspect of moral reasoning is modular. (Presumably they think that futur puma trionfo e research will reveal that puma speedcat suede other aspects of moral reasoning are modular as Jesse J. Prinz well.) In particular, they say we have a module dedicated to reasoning about social exchanges, and this module contains inference rules that allow us to catch cheaters: individuals who receive benefits from others without paying the appropriate costs. To argue for functional modularity, they present subjects with a class of conditional reasoning problems called the Wason selection task. When presented with conditionals outside the moral domain, subjects perform very poorly on this task. For example, subjects might be told that, according to a women’s magazine, “If a woman eats salad, then she drinks diet soda.” They are then asked about which women they would need to check to confirm whether this conditional is true. Subjects realize that they need to check women who eat salads, but they often don’t realize that they must also check women who don’t drink diet soda. In contrast, subjects perform extremely well when they are presented with conditionals that involve cheater detection. For example, some subjects are told they need to check for violators of the rule “If you watch TV, your room has to be clean.” Subjects immediately recognize that they must check people with dirty rooms and make sure that they are not