characteristics: they are considered more serious than conventional rules, they are justifi ed by appeal to their harmful effects on a victim, and they are regarded as objectively true, independent of what anyone happens to believe about them. Kicking a stranger is a serious offense, it is wrong because it causes pain, and it would be wrong even if the local authorities announced that it was acceptable to kick strangers. Wearing pajamas to the office is not very serious, it causes no pain, and it would be acceptable if the authorities permitted it (imagine an office slumber party or a new fashion trend). Smetana (1995) and Turiel (1998) survey evidence that puma trionfo shoes this basic division is drawn across cultures, economic classes, religions, and age groups. It seems to be universal. They think that learning may play an important role in fostering sensitivity to this distinction, but the distinction itself is unlearned. Learning awakens innate understanding of the Cheap puma uk moral domain. I will return to puma trainers for men the issue of learning below. For now, I also want to grant that people can universally distinguish rules using the three criteria: some transgressions are serious, intrinsically harmful, and authority independent. What I want speed cat big 2011 to question is whether these criteria really carve out a domain that deserves to be called “morality.” I want to argue that the criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient for accommodating rules that are pretheoretically regarded as moral. My discussion is heavily infl uenced by Kelly and Stich (forthcoming), who offer a trenchant critique. First, consider seriousness. Some violations of pretheoretically moral rules are serious, but others are not. It is morally wrong to eat the last cookie in the house without offering to share, but not extremely wrong. Conversely, it is seriously wrong to go to work naked, even though wearing clothing is just a societal convention. Next consider intrinsic harm. One might justify one’s distaste for scarification by pointing out that it is intrinsically harmful, but this distaste reflects a personal preference, not a moral denunciation; many of us would say scarification is morally acceptable but intrinsically harmful. Conversely, some people regard certain actions as morally unacceptable, but not intrinsically harmful. For example, Haidt Is Morality Innate? et al. (1993) found that some people regard it as morally wrong to wash a toilet with the national flag. Finally, consider authority independence. In many cultures people morally condemn behavior that is regarded as authority dependent. Jews, for example, sometimes say that certain dietary laws (e.g., combining dairy and meat) hold in virtue of divine command, and these laws would not hold if God had commanded different, and they do not hold for non-Jews. Smetana, Turiel, and Nucci can accommodate this cas puma trionfo e only by saying that Je puma speedcat suede ws imagine God is harmed by diet violations or by saying that Jews actually regard such rules as merely conventional. Both replies are flagrantly ad hoc. Conversely, there are many rules that are authority independent but not necessarily moral: we should cultivate our talents, we should avoid eating rotten meat, and we should take advice from those who are wiser than us. There are even cases of actions that are serious, intrinsically harmful, authority independent, and, nevertheless, not immoral. Gratuitously sawing off one’s own foot is an example. In sum, the operational criteria used by Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana do not coincide perfectly with the pretheoretical understanding of the moral domain. If people are universally sensitive to these criteria, it does not follow that they universally comprehend the moral/conventional distinction. Indeed, there may be cultures where moral and conventional rules are inextricably bound. For many traditional societies, contingent social practices, including rules of diet and ornament, are construed morally. People who violate these rules are chastised and made to feel guilt or shame. The distinction is often blurry at best. Indeed, I suspect that moral and conventional are two orthogonal dimensions. Consider a rule like “Don’t harm a member of your in-group.” S puma trionfo uk shops tated abstractly, this rule may not have any identifi able conventional component, but things change as soon as we begin to make the rule specific enough to apply in practice. We can harm in-group members in initiation rights, for example, or in sporting events. Cultural conventions determine the scope of harm prohibitions. Thus, we can pumas shoes 2011 not fully specify such norms without appeal to some contingent features of culture. Consequently, we will have harm norms that are authority contingent: It is morally wrong to scar a teenager’s face with a stone tool in this culture but morally acceptable in cultures where the practice of scarifi cation is embraced. Correlatively, rules that seem to puma trainers for men be patently conventional have a moral dimension. It’s conventionally wrong to wear shoes inside in Japan, but failure to comply with this rule is a form of disrespect, and the precept that we should respect others is moral. These examples suggest that rules of conduct generally have both moral and conventional components. Jesse J. Prinz The very same act can count as a moral violation or as a conventional violation depending on how it is described. This last point is not intended as a rejection of the mora Puma shoes uk l/conventional distinction. I think the dist cheap puma trainers inction is real, but it is not a distinction between kinds of rules, but rather a distinction between components of rules. However, how are we to distinguish those components? I think the moral dimensions of rules (“Don’t harm!” “Show respect!”) are themselves culturally constructed. Thus, the distinction between moral dimensions of pumas shoes 2011 rules and conventional dimensions cannot be a distinction between absol