or when we stand to gain one way or the other” (Rawls, 1971, p. 47; see also Rawls, 1950, 1951). One may question the specific criteria Rawls identifies, but his decision to limit attention to a subset of the available data in this manner should be uncontroversial. All successful sciences isolate some phenomena by ignoring others, and any serious attempt to describe the structure of a cognitive system must seek reasonable ways to reduce the complexity of that system and to identify its fundamental properties (Mikhail, 2002b). From this vantage point, Rawls’s reliance on the considered judgments of an ideal moral observer appears analogous to Chomsky’s use of a competence- performance distinction in the form of the grammaticality judgments of an “ideal speaker-listener” (Chomsky, 1965; s pumas shoes 2011 ee also Mikhail, 2000). puma trionfo uk shops 2. See Locke (1690/1991, book II, chapter 28, section 14) observing that when we consider “the complex Idea” signified by the word “Murther” and examine its particulars, we find it “to amount to a Collection of simple Ideas . . . [such as] Willing, Considering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wishing Ill to another; and also of Life, or Percep puma trainers for men tion, and Self-Motion . . . [and] a Man, and of some Action, whereby we put an end to Perception and Motion in the Man . . . So that whencesoever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Virtues or Vices, they consist only . . . of Collections of simple Ideas . . . [whose] Rectitude, or Obliquity, consists in the Agreement, or Disagreement, with those Patterns prescribed by some Law.” 3. See Hume (1739/1978, book III, part I, section 1): “Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all its lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions an Puma online canada d thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You can never find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.” 4. The alternative is to have criminal trials risk faltering on whether this element has been successfully proven. Unsurprisingly, no sound criminal justice system works this wa cheap puma trainers y. Wrongfulness is never treated as an element of murder, but only (if at all) as a legal conclusion. The crucial issue, in other words, is one of logical priority. The law never requires an ac pumas shoes 2011 t of killing to be proven wrongful in order for it to be characterized as murder. Instead, it requires the act to be proven to be murder (or another form of criminal homicide) in order for it to be characterized as wrong (Mikhail, 2002b). Reply to Harman and Mikhail Chandra Sekhar Sripada I want to thank Gilbert Harman and John Mikhail for their thoughtful responses to my paper. In this response section, I will focus on one criticism that I view as particularly important and that forms the central thread of their critiques. Both Harman and Mikhail take issue with my rejection of a poverty of stimulus argument in the domain of morality. I argued that one key disanalogy between language learning and moral norm learning is that in the case of moral norm learning, the learning target is far simpler than in the case of language. In particular, I argued that human grammars consist of hierarchical tree structures and recursive rules that are far removed from experience. Moral norms learning, in contrast, merely requires that the child acquire a readily understandable collection of fairly concrete rules, and I offered several examples—“Share your toys,” “Don’t hit other children,” “Respect your elders,” and “Don’t eat pork.” Both H puma store canada arman and Mikhail counter that I have oversimplified and thus mischaracterized the nature of the competence that is acquired by the child. They argue that the list of rather simple imperatives that I suggest misses the fac puma trionfo shoes t that children make subtle and sophisticated moral judgments that require complex mental operations. In their replies, they offer many examples of moral judgments that do indeed seem to embody sophisticated puma trainers for men principles, concepts, and theories, suggesting that some kind of innate structure must be invoked to explain how young children acquire and master these judgments. I’ll review some of Harman and Mikhail’s examples in a moment, but before doing so, I want to raise the worry that my arguments and Harman and Mikhail’s critiques are, at least in some respects, talking past each other. In the first part of the chapter, in the section titled “Preliminary Clarifications,” I drew a distinction between two kinds speed cat big 2011 of nativist claims— capacity nativism versus content nativism. “Capacity nativism” refers to the Chandra Sekhar Sripada question of whether, and to what extent, a number of norm-associated capacities are innate. As I wrote, Consider the following moral norm: Don’t kill any member of your own group. In order to understand this norm and utilize the norm in day-to-day interactions with others, it’s plausible that a person will need to draw upon a large number of cognitive capacities. . . . For example, in order to recognize a particular behavior as an instance of killing, a person will need a “theory of action,” that is, the capacity to parse agents’ physical movements into sequences of actions with the appropriate assignment of causal relations between actions and their outcomes. A second cognitive capacity that plays a role in moral judgment is “theory of mind,” that is, the capacity to attribute mental states such as beliefs and desires to other agents. Theory of mind might be used, for example, to determine whether an agent’s actions are intended versus unintended, and these determinations in turn infl uence judgments about the agent’s blameworthiness. (p. 321) There are a number of other capacities that might be relevant to moral cognition besides the two listed above, including the capacity to distinguish living things from nonliving things and the capacity to exert self- control in the face of temptation. A key feature of these capacities is that while they play a role in facilitating moral judgment and moral decision making, they play a role in a host of other cognitive domains as well. For example, consider the following two sce puma trionfo narios: (1) a man uses a knife in order to cut a woman in order to steal her money, and (2) a child uses a knife in order to cut a lemon in order to make a glass of lemonade. Theory of mind and theory of action may play a ro puma speedcat suede l Puma canada e in understanding the intentions and actions of the agents in both of these scenarios, but the operation of these capacities is likely to be linked to moral judgment only in the former scenario and not in the latter. Thus, theory of mind, theory of action, and the other capacities listed above can be thought of as being much like the visual system in that while they may be utilized in the process of making moral judgments, they are by no means specific to the domain of moral cognition and may be utilized for a host of other functions as well. I contrasted capacity nativism with what I called “content nativism.” The content of a moral norm consists of the class of actions that the norm prohibits, permits, or requires. Anthropologists have documented a complex pattern of both commonalities and differences in the contents of moral norms across human